Oxytocin shapes the neural circuitry of trust and trust adaptation in humans by Baumgartner, Thomas et al.
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2008
Oxytocin shapes the neural circuitry of trust and trust adaptation
in humans
Baumgartner, T; Heinrichs, M; Vonlanthen, A; Fischbacher, U; Fehr, E
Baumgartner, T; Heinrichs, M; Vonlanthen, A; Fischbacher, U; Fehr, E (2008). Oxytocin shapes the neural circuitry
of trust and trust adaptation in humans. Neuron, 58(4):639-650.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Neuron 2008, 58(4):639-650.
Baumgartner, T; Heinrichs, M; Vonlanthen, A; Fischbacher, U; Fehr, E (2008). Oxytocin shapes the neural circuitry
of trust and trust adaptation in humans. Neuron, 58(4):639-650.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Neuron 2008, 58(4):639-650.
Oxytocin shapes the neural circuitry of trust and trust adaptation
in humans
Abstract
Trust and betrayal of trust are ubiquitous in human societies. Recent behavioral evidence shows that the
neuropeptide oxytocin increases trust among humans, thus offering a unique chance of gaining a deeper
understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying trust and the adaptation to breach of trust. We
examined the neural circuitry of trusting behavior by combining the intranasal, double-blind,
administration of oxytocin with fMRI. We find that subjects in the oxytocin group show no change in
their trusting behavior after they learned that their trust had been breached several times while subjects
receiving placebo decrease their trust. This difference in trust adaptation is associated with a specific
reduction in activation in the amygdala, the midbrain regions, and the dorsal striatum in subjects
receiving oxytocin, suggesting that neural systems mediating fear processing (amygdala and midbrain
regions) and behavioral adaptations to feedback information (dorsal striatum) modulate oxytocin's effect
on trust. These findings may help to develop deeper insights into mental disorders such as social phobia
and autism, which are characterized by persistent fear or avoidance of social interactions.
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Summary 
Trust and betrayal of trust are ubiquitous in human societies. Recent behavioral evidence 
shows that the neuropeptide oxytocin increases trust among humans, thus offering a unique 
chance of gaining a deeper understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying trust and the 
adaptation to breach of trust. We examined the neural circuitry of trusting behavior by 
combining the intranasal, double-blind, administration of oxytocin with fMRI. We find that 
subjects in the oxytocin group show no change in their trusting behavior after they learned 
that their trust had been breached several times while subjects receiving placebo decrease 
their trust. This difference in trust adaptation is associated with a specific reduction in 
activation in the amygdala, the midbrain regions, and the dorsal striatum in subjects receiving 
oxytocin, suggesting that neural systems mediating fear processing (amygdala and midbrain 
regions) and behavioral adaptations to feedback information (dorsal striatum) modulate 
oxytocin’s effect on trust. These findings may help to develop deeper insights into mental 
disorders such as social phobia and autism, which are characterized by persistent fear or 
avoidance of social interactions. 
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Introduction 
In non-human mammals the neuropeptide oxytocin (OT) plays a central role in the ability to 
form social attachments and affiliations, including parental care, pair bonding, and social 
memory (Carter, 1998, 2003; Ferguson et al., 2002; Insel and Young, 2001; Lim and Young, 
2006; Young and Wang, 2004). In addition, OT shows significant binding in the limbic 
system, including the amygdala (Huber et al., 2005; Landgraf and Neumann, 2004), and 
decreases stress responses and anxiety in social interactions (Bale et al., 2001; Neumann et 
al., 2000; Parker et al., 2005; Uvnas-Moberg, 1998a, b). Initial behavioral experiments 
indicate that OT also seems to be a potent modulator of social interaction behavior and social 
cognition in humans (Bartz and Hollander, 2006; Heinrichs and Gaab, 2007). OT has recently 
been shown to influence a person’s ability to infer another’s mental state, an ability that is 
referred to as ‘mind-reading’ (Domes et al., 2007b). Moreover, a recent study has shown that 
OT increases people’s willingness to trust others (Kosfeld et al., 2005). Interestingly, OT’s 
effect on trust was not due to a general increase in the readiness to bear risks. Instead, OT 
specifically affected individuals’ willingness to take social risks arising through interpersonal 
interactions. The behavioral impact of OT on trust offers a unique chance to gain a deeper 
understanding into the neural circuitry of trust and trust adaptation after betrayal of trust by 
combining behavioral experiments with pharmacological intervention and neuroimaging 
methods. To date, however, no study on the effects of this peptide on the neural circuitry 
associated with human trusting behavior is available. Moreover, it is not known how OT 
affects trust after subjects experienced that their trust had been betrayed, i.e., we do not know 
whether subjects receiving OT respond to this betrayal with a decrease in trust or whether 
they maintain their trusting behavior. We thus examined the effects of intranasally 
administered OT on both brain activity and individuals’ decisions in a trust and a risk game 
with real monetary stakes after subjects received feedback indicating that their trust had been 
betrayed or that their risky investment resulted in no payback in about half the cases.  
Our work is based on the combination of neuroscientific tools with economic 
experiments which recently gained momentum through the neuroeconomics research agenda 
(Camerer et al., 2005; Cohen and Blum, 2002; De Quervain et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2004; 
Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Glimcher, 2002; Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; Hsu et al., 2005; 
King-Casas et al., 2005; Knoch et al., 2006; Knutson et al., 2007; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; 
Montague and Berns, 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007). We apply, in particular, 
a suitably modified version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995; Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; 
Fehr et al., 1993) to address our research questions. In a trust game (Figure 1), two subjects 
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interacting anonymously are in the role of an investor (who is in the scanner) and a trustee. 
The investor first has the chance of choosing a costly trusting action by giving money to the 
trustee. If the investor transfers money, the total amount available for distribution between the 
two players increases because the experimenter triples the investor’s transfer. Initially, 
however, the trustee reaps the whole increase. Then the trustee is informed about the 
investor’s transfer and can then honour the investor’s trust by sending back money 
(“sharing”), so that both subjects earn the same amount of money. Thus, if the investor gives 
money to the trustee and the latter shares, both players end up with a higher and equal 
monetary payoff. However, the trustee also has the option of violating the investor’s trust by 
not sharing the money. In this case the investor loses all the money he sent to the trustee, an 
event that investors typically interpret as a breach or betrayal of trust (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 
2004). Since sharing the money is costly for the trustee, a selfish trustee will never honour the 
investor’s trust because the investor and the trustee interact only once in the experiment.  
In the risk (lottery) game, the investor faces the same choices and exactly the same 
probabilistic risk as in the trust game, but a random computer mechanism implements the 
payback and no interaction with a trustee takes place. Thus, the only difference between the 
two games is that the investor’s risk in the trust game arises from the uncertainty regarding 
the trustee’s behavior – that is, a social interaction with a specific trustee constitutes the risk – 
whereas a non-social, random, mechanism determines the investor’s risk in the lottery game. 
The risk game constitutes an important control condition because economic theories (Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993) and previous empirical research 
(Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) has shown that many people have an aversion against being 
betrayed when they trust another person (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004), but betrayal aversion 
cannot play a role in situations involving non-social risks. In addition, OT has been shown to 
increase trust but not risk taking, suggesting the conjecture that OT reduces the special fears 
that are associated with social betrayal (Kosfeld et al., 2005). Therefore, OT may affect brain 
activity in these two games differently.  
An investor either received OT or placebo. We had a total of 49 investors, each of whom 
played 12 risk periods (games) and 12 trust periods (games) that took place in a random order. 
The investor faced a new trustee in every trust period. Figure 2 depicts a timeline for one 
period of a trust and a lottery game for subjects in the scanner. After the first 12 periods, in 
which 6 risk games and 6 trust games took place, the investors received feedback that 
informed them how often their investment was successful in the risk game and how often the 
trustee paid back money in the trust game. Thus, the investors received feedback only once – 
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at the end of the first 12 periods. The feedback information told the investors that their 
investment led to a return or their trust was repaid only in about 50% of the cases (see Figure 
2 and methods section for detailed description of feedback administration). In the following 
we refer to the first 6 risk and 6 trust games as the pre-feedback phase, while the periods after 
the feedback are referred to as the post-feedback phase. Taken together our experimental 
design creates thus three main variables: group (OT, placebo), phase (pre-feedback, post-
feedback) and game (trust, risk). 
Previous findings from neuroimaging and lesion studies led us to hypothesize that 
subcortical brain structures such as the amygdala and brainstem effector sites – that process 
fear, danger, and perhaps also risk of social betrayal – are involved in trusting behaviors. The 
amygdala has been shown to exhibit increased activation in social avoidance and phobia 
(Stein et al., 2002; Tillfors et al., 2001) and while viewing untrustworthy faces (Winston et 
al., 2002). Decreased amygdala activation has also been linked to genetic hypersociability 
(Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005) and lesion studies have indicated that patients with bilateral 
amygdala damage are impaired in judging the trustworthiness of other people’s faces. These 
patients all judged other people to look more trustworthy and more approachable than did 
normal viewers (Adolphs et al., 1998). Finally, during the processing of fearful stimuli, 
subjects receiving OT have reduced amygdala activation, and reduced connectivity of the 
amygdala with brainstem regions involved in automatic fear reactivity (Domes et al., 2007a; 
Kirsch et al., 2005). This finding is in agreement with a recent animal study that demonstrates 
in vitro that OT acts on the central amygdala by inhibiting excitatory information from the 
amygdala to brainstem sites mediating the autonomic fear response (Huber et al., 2005). 
Given that the amygdala is crucially involved in the processing of risks arising in social 
situations, we hypothesized that oxytocin might affect the amygdala response to these social 
risks, thereby facilitating prosocial approach behavior – such as trust.  
Other relevant evidence comes from neuroimaging studies using economic experiments 
involving social interaction paradigms (Delgado et al., 2005a; King-Casas et al., 2005; Rilling 
et al., 2002). These studies suggest the striatum could play a role in our experiment; it is 
thought to be part of a neural circuit that guides and adjusts future behavior on the basis of 
reward feedback (O'Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004). Moreover, a study of reward-
related (non-social) probability learning has shown that activation in this region in response to 
reward feedback diminishes, as cues learned through trial and error begin to predict how 
actions and outcomes are related, thus making feedback less informative (Delgado et al., 
2005b). This finding has been extended to a repeated-interaction trust game in which 
 5
participants faced the same opponent and gradually learned whether their partner is 
trustworthy through experience. Over time, as the partner’s response became more 
predictable, the activity in the dorsal striatum decreased in this game (King-Casas et al., 
2005). Trial and error is not the sole method for learning predictability, however. It has been 
recently shown that the perceptions of moral character alone suffice to modulate the dorsal 
striatum during both the decision and the outcome phases of a trust game (Delgado et al., 
2005a). Participants made risky choices about whether to trust hypothetical trading partners 
after having read vivid descriptions of life events indicating praiseworthy, neutral, or 
suspicious moral character. Activations in the striatum differentiated between positive and 
negative feedback as well as between no-trust and trust decisions, but only for the “neutral” 
partner, whereas no differential activity was observed for the “good” partner despite the fact 
that (by experimental design) neutral and good partners responded in the same way to trusting 
decisions. This finding suggests that prior social and moral information can diminish reliance 
on brain structures such as the dorsal striatum that are important for behavioral adaptations to 
feedback information. These brain structures may also be recruited in our experiment as the 
subjects may feel the need to adjust their behaviors following meager information feedback. 
Therefore, if OT indeed diminishes the behavioral adaptation to this feedback, such an effect 
might be modulated by a diminished reliance on brain structures involved in behavioral 
adaptation.  
Regarding the two different phases of the study (pre- and post-feedback phase), it is 
important to note that subjects in the pre-feedback phase have an incentive to explore 
different strategies in order to maximize the informativeness of the feedback. In order to 
maximize learning about the trustworthiness of the trustees’ subject pool, for example, the 
investors may have an incentive to make more trusting decisions in the pre-feedback phase 
because the gleaned knowledge about the trustees’ trustworthiness can be valuable for 
behavioral adaptation after the feedback. An additional motive for trusting choices in the pre-
feedback phase thus exists that is absent in the post-feedback phase. Note too that in order to 
enable a clean comparison between the two games in the post-feedback phase, subjects 
received the same feedback in the risk and the trust game because the probability distribution 
of investment successes in the risk game replicated the probability distribution of the trustees’ 
responses in the trust game (see methods section for details). 
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Results 
Behavioral results 
Our main behavioral measure consists of each individual’s average investment in the risk and 
the trust game during the pre-feedback and the post-feedback phase, yielding four 
observations per individual. We performed a two-way repeated measures ANOVA based on 
these observations for the risk and the trust game (controlling for potential personality 
differences in general trust (Siegrist et al., 2006) and general risk seeking propensity 
(Zuckerman.M and Link, 1968) and feedback information; see methods section for details). 
This analysis reveals a significant interaction effect in the trust game (group×phase: F(1,40) = 
4.06, p = 0.05, ETA2 = 0.11), which is absent in the risk game (group×phase: F(1,40) = 0.04, p = 
0.85, ETA2 = 0.001). Subjects receiving the placebo decreased their trusting behavior after 
they were informed that their interaction partner did not pay back in about 50% of the cases, 
whereas subjects receiving OT demonstrated no change in their trusting behavior in the post-
feedback phase (see Figure 3 and supplementary Table 1) despite having received the same 
information. In the risk game, however, both groups showed no behavioral adaptation to the 
feedback information. Thus, it seems that OT only affects the behavioral adaptation to the 
feedback information if social risks are involved, but not if non-social risks are involved.  
The specific impact of OT on behavioral adaptation in the trust but not in the risk 
game is complemented by similarly specific response time differences between the OT and 
placebo group. Individuals in the OT group exhibit considerably smaller response times than 
those in the placebo group (t = -2.77, p < 0.01) during the post-feedback phase, whereas no 
significant differences (t = 0.51, p = 0.61) are present during the pre-feedback phase (see 
supplementary Table 2). This difference in the post-feedback phase is, in particular, due to the 
significant decline in responses times in the OT group in the post-feedback phase compared to 
the pre-feedback phase (t = 2.72, p < 0.05). The response time effect of OT in the trust game 
contrasts with the risk game in which we observe no significant differences between the two 
groups in the pre-feedback and in the post-feedback phase.  
In order to control for non-specific effects that might be associated with OT 
administration, we explicitly measured mood, calmness, and wakefulness before substance 
administration and 10 minutes after the end of the scanning session (after subjects had played 
both the risk and trust game). We observed no significant group differences (independent t-
tests: all p > 0.26, see Supplementary Table 3) neither before the scanning session nor 
afterwards. Finally, we asked subjects at the end of the experiment whether they believed they 
had received OT or the placebo. 34% of subjects in the placebo group and 30% of subjects in 
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the OT group reported the impression they had received OT. A correlation between this belief 
question and the effective administration of OT or the placebo showed no significant 
correlation (Spearman correlation: r = -.107, p = 0.470), thus clearly indicating that neither 
subjects in the OT nor in the placebo group recognized whether they had received OT or a 
placebo.  
 
Neuroimaging results 
We conducted analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data for the 
decision phase of the trust and the risk game. A random effects general linear model (GLM) 
analysis was conducted using each condition (trust and risk game) and period (6 pre-feedback 
periods and 6 post-feedback periods) as predictors. We generated statistical maps contrasting 
the OT and the placebo groups using serial subtraction terms, separately for pre-feedback and 
post-feedback periods. The serial subtraction term consisted either of trust > risk contrasts or 
risk > trust contrasts, and was exclusively masked at p < 0.05 with the reversed second 
contrast of the serial subtraction term (see methods section for explanation). For example, one 
important statistical map in the post-feedback phase concerns (Trust > Risk)P > (Trust > 
Risk)OT, exclusively masked with the reverse second contrast (Risk > Trust)OT. Here OT 
denotes oxytocin and P indicates placebo. The results of this map reveal the brain activations 
that are specific to trust taking (relative to risk taking) in the placebo (P) group, i.e. the extent 
to which OT reduces brain activations when individuals make choices in the trust game. 
Significant results are reported at p < 0.005 (uncorrected) with a cluster threshold of 10 
voxels. In case of significant unilateral activations in our main regions of interests, including 
the amygdala and striatum, we lowered the significance threshold to p < 0.01 (uncorrected) 
with the same voxel extent to verify whether a bilateral activation pattern could be found at 
this threshold.   
 
Pre-feedback Periods 
A few differences were observed between the OT and placebo group during the decision 
phase of pre-feedback periods, both in the trust and risk game. The OT group showed stronger 
activation of the Thalamus (x = 15, y = -27, z = 6), whereas the placebo group demonstrated 
increased activation in the dorsal part of the ACC (x = 6, y = 24, z = 12, see Figure 4A) 
during pre-feedback trust game periods (see Table 1). During the pre-feedback risk game, 
increased activation in the OT group was found in the inferior temporal gyrus (x = 39, y = -
54, z = -15), whereas the placebo group showed a relative increase of activation in parietal 
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brain regions (Precuneus / Posterior Cingulate: x = -15, y = -60, z = 21; Superior Parietal 
Gyrus: x = 30, y = -60, z = 48). We will discuss these pre-feedback activations in the Risk > 
Trust contrast in the supplementary material (supplementary discussion) because in the main 
text we are mainly interested in the Trust > Risk contrasts.  
 
Post-feedback periods  
As hypothesized, the placebo group showed stronger activation in post-feedback trust game 
periods in the bilateral amygdala (x = 30, y = 3, z = -18; x = -24, y = 0, z = -21), bilateral 
caudatus (x = 12, y = 6, z = 9; x = -9, y = 0, z = 12), midbrain regions (x = -3, y = -24, z = -3), 
as well as arousal related structures such as the posterior insula (x = -33, y = -21, z = 0) and 
postcentral gyrus (x = -27, y = -54, z = 69; see Table 2 and Figure 4B). In contrast, not a 
single brain region showed group differences during the post-feedback risk game. Moreover, 
no brain region showed an activation increase in the OT compared to the placebo group 
during the post-feedback trust game.  
 
ROI analyses for pre-feedback and post-feedback periods 
For all brain regions showing differing group activation either pre-feedback or post-feedback 
(see Table 1 and 2), we created combined functional and structural (based on the anatomic 
atlas by Tzourio-Mazoyer et al.(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) ROIs and calculated repeated 
measures ANOVAs using participants’ beta weights (for details see methods section). These 
analyses allow a deeper examination of (1) the lateralisation pattern in the amygdala and the 
caudatus, (2) the effect of the pre-feedback and the post-feedback phase on activation patterns 
in all brain regions, as well as (3) the influence on brain activation of the potentially 
confounding variables used in the behavioral analysis (including general trust (Siegrist et al., 
2006), sensation seeking (Zuckerman.M and Link, 1968) and feedback information, see 
methods section). These ANOVAs confirm the previously reported results in Tables 1 and 2. 
In particular, we find a robust interaction effect between Group and Time Phase in bilateral 
amygdala and the right caudatus indicating that subjects in the placebo group only show 
higher activations in these brain regions in the post-feedback phase of the trust game, where 
we observe the differences in behavioral adaptation across the OT and the placebo group (see 
supplementary Table 5 and 6 for detailed information). This interaction between Group and 
Time Phase is also present if we control for potentially confounding variables, such as 
personality differences in general trust, sensation seeking, or mood; if we do not control for 
these differences then the interaction effect is also obtained in the left Caudatus. Finally, we 
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calculated univariate ANOVAs to control for response time differences between the OT and 
placebo group observed in post-feedback periods. There was no effect of response times on 
the brain activation patterns in these analyses (see supplementary Table 7).  
 
 
Discussion 
This is the first study showing how OT affects humans’ behavioral adaptation to meager 
feedback information about the success of previous trust and risk taking. Our results indicate 
that intranasally administered OT indeed affects these behavioral adaptations in a specific 
way. If subjects face the non-social risks in the risk game, OT does not affect their behavioral 
responses to the feedback. Both subjects in the OT group and the placebo group do not change 
their willingness to take risks after the feedback. In contrast, if subjects face social risks, such 
as in the trust game, those who received placebo respond to the feedback with a decrease in 
trusting behavior while subjects with OT demonstrate no change in their trusting behavior 
although they were informed that their interaction partners did not honor their trust in roughly 
50% of the cases.  
These behavioral findings are consistent with the hypothesis that betrayal aversion is 
operative in the trust game (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) and that OT contributes to a 
reduction in the fear of social betrayal (Kosfeld et al., 2005). Subjects in the risk game need 
not fear that another individual will breach their trust because they only face the probabilistic 
risk arising from a pre-programmed computer, i.e., betrayal aversion could play no role in the 
risk game. In contrast, subjects face a human partner in the trust game who has the option of 
abusing their trust. The response time differences between the OT and the placebo group 
during the post-feedback phase also support this interpretation. Subjects in the OT group need 
significantly less time to make a trusting decision, consistent with the view that it is easier for 
them to overcome the trust-inhibiting force of betrayal aversion.  
Our findings also conform with both animal and human studies showing that OT 
ameliorates the symptoms associated with social anxiety and stress (Heinrichs et al., 2003; 
Insel and Young, 2001). We suggest that future studies could systematically manipulate 
feedback information to examine whether OT reduces reliance on feedback mechanism and 
thus increases trusting behavior regardless of how negative the feedback information is or 
whether extremely negative feedback information (e.g. reinforcement rates below 20 percent) 
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will diminish or even abolish OT’s effect on behavioral adaptation in situations requiring 
trust. 
The finding that OT had no behavioral impact on trusting behavior in pre-feedback 
periods might seem surprising at first. However, we already pointed out that subjects faced 
additional incentives to transfer money to the trustees in the pre-feedback periods because 
they knew they would receive feedback. The only way to learn about the degree of 
trustworthiness in the population of trustees is to transfer money to them. If OT indeed 
reduces betrayal aversion, the incentive to explore the trustees’ trustworthiness must 
obviously be weaker in the OT group than in the placebo group because subjects with OT are 
less afraid of betrayal. Thus, the placebo group has a stronger reason for extracting 
information from the feedback, implying that they also transfer more money relative to their 
natural inclination to trust. If placebo subjects experience this conflict between their natural 
inclination to trust and the incentive to explore their partners’ trustworthiness, the brain 
should then represent this conflict. In this context, it is therefore interesting to observe that the 
placebo subjects in the trust game exhibit higher activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), a brain region frequently implicated in conflict monitoring and cognitive 
control in social (Delgado et al., 2005a; Sanfey et al., 2003) and non-social paradigms 
(Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al., 1998). In fact, the dorsal ACC is the only brain region 
showing increased activation in the placebo compared to the OT group during the pre-
feedback periods of the trust game which strengthens our interpretation of the behavioral 
finding.  
The brain activations we find in the post-feedback phase (Table 2) are also very 
informative with regard to the neural networks involved in the reduced behavioral adaptation 
to the meager feedback in the trust game, and its absence in the risk game. There are no 
differences in brain activation between the OT and the placebo group in the risk game, where 
we observe no behavioral differences. In contrast, as hypothesized, we find differences 
between the placebo and the OT group in the amygdala, the midbrain as well as the striatum 
in post-feedback trust periods, i.e., exactly in those periods in which we also observe 
differences in behavioral adaptation to the feedback information. More precisely, the bilateral 
amygdala and functionally connected brainstem effector sites showed significantly increased 
activation in the placebo compared to the OT group in post-feedback trust periods. A vast area 
of research in animal, human lesion, and neuroimaging studies points to the critical role of 
these brain areas in signaling and modulating fear responses (Adolphs et al., 2005; Amaral, 
2003). Moreover, both human neuroimaging (Kirsch et al., 2005) and animal studies (Huber 
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et al., 2005) have shown that the neuropeptide OT decreases fear responses by modulating 
activation in the amygdala and brainstem effector sites. Finally, it has been reported that the 
amygdala shows increased activation during viewing faces of people that look untrustworthy 
(Winston et al., 2002), and that patients with bilateral amygdala damage judged other people 
to look more trustworthy and more approachable than did normal viewers or other patients 
with brain damage in other areas (Adolphs et al., 1998). Taken together, these findings are 
consistent with the view that OT reduces fear responses during the trust game by reducing 
activation in the amygdala and connected brainstem effector sites, which in turn enhances 
subjects’ ability to trust in situations characterized by the risk of betrayal.  
Animal studies indicate that increased availability of OT in the central nervous system 
facilitates approach behavior (affiliation and social attachment) by modulating brain circuits 
such as the nucleus accumbens (part of the striatum) and ventral pallidum (Insel and Young, 
2001; Young et al., 2001) that are implicated in reward processing. In the light of these 
findings, it is interesting that in our experiment, OT reduces activations in a closely related 
striatal area – the caudate nucleus – in the trust game. Neuroimaging studies (O'Doherty et al., 
2004; Tricomi et al., 2004) have shown that the caudate is critically involved in feedback 
processing and reward learning associated with behavioral adaptations to information about 
the action-outcome contingencies, and several studies document (Delgado et al., 2005b; King-
Casas et al., 2005) that caudate activation is reduced as learning progresses and rewards can 
be more reliably predicted. Thus, once subjects in these studies have learned the contingency 
between their actions and the associated outcomes the caudate is less active. Moreover, a 
recent neuroimaging study (Delgado et al., 2005a) of investor behavior in the trust game has 
shown that the mere perception of a morally “good” character and to a lesser extent, of a 
morally “bad” character (implemented by the attribution of vivid descriptions of life events – 
indicating morally good, neural, or moral bad behaviors – to the faces of three different 
partners), already diminishes activations in caudate nucleus during the initial stages of the 
trust game. In contrast, the caudate is strongly activated during decision and outcome phases 
of the trust game when participants faced a morally “neutral” partner. Despite equivalent 
reinforcement rates (50%) for all three partners, subjects were more likely to trust the “good” 
partner, even during the later periods of the trust game. Thus, when playing the “good” 
partner, subjects behave as if they “know” that the “good” partner is more trustworthy, i.e., 
they exhibit less behavioral adaptation to the same feedback information, and this lack of 
reliance on the feedback information is associated with less caudate activation.  
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It is interesting that OT administration and the explicit knowledge of facing a morally 
"good" partner both generate similar behavioral patterns and neural responses in the caudate 
nucleus. Recall, we also find less behavioral adaptation to feedback information in subjects 
with OT and – like in the other study (Delgado et al., 2005a) – this behavioral pattern is 
associated with diminished caudate activation. Thus, subjects with OT behave as if they 
implicitly “know” that they can trust their partners and this may be the reason why the brain 
structure that is critical for learning the contingency between actions and outcomes – the 
caudate nucleus – shows diminished activation.  
It is also important to note that the effect of OT on trust occurred without subjective 
awareness because subjects were completely unaware whether they received OT. There was 
also no difference in questionnaire measures of mood, calmness, and wakefulness between the 
placebo and the OT subjects. And finally, the differences in brain activation between placebo 
and OT subjects were only observed in subcortical structures as the amygdala, the midbrain, 
and the striatum. Those brain structures have each been associated with automatic and 
intuitive (Bechara et al., 1997; McClure et al., 2004) or even unconscious processes (Pasley et 
al., 2004). Various studies show that amygdala activation is also seen when fearful facial 
expressions of emotion are presented briefly and masked to prevent conscious perception 
(Whalen et al., 1998) or when presented in a cortically blind field (Morris et al., 2001; Pegna 
et al., 2005). Thus, taken together, these findings suggest that OT exerts its effect 
automatically or even unconsciously in subcortical brain structures which can be modulated 
without explicit awareness of the subjects.  
Human societies are probably unique in the extent to which trust characterizes interpersonal 
interactions. Trust is indispensable in friendship, love, families, and organizations, and it is a 
lubricant of economic, political, and social exchange. However, whenever we trust there is 
also the possibility of trust betrayal. Despite the fact that most humans have experienced 
instances of breach of trust, they still remain capable of trusting others. In this study, we 
examined the neural circuitry of trust after breach of trust by studying how OT affects the 
behaviors and the brain networks of subjects whose trust has been broken in about 50% of the 
cases. OT significantly reduces subjects’ behavioral adaptation to such meager feedback 
information. This behavioral effect is accompanied by a reduced activity in brain areas known 
to be involved in fear processing (amygdala, midbrain) and behavioral adaptation (caudate 
nucleus) in situations with unknown action-outcome contingencies. These effects of OT on 
brain activations are highly specific in the sense that they only occur when OT affects 
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behavior. They are absent in the risk game, where OT does not affect the behavioral 
adaptation to the same feedback information.  
Finally, our insights into the neural circuitry of trust adaptation, and oxytocin’s role in 
trust adaptation, may also contribute to a deeper understanding of mental disorders such as 
social phobia or autism that are associated with social deficits. In particular, social phobia 
(which is the third most common mental health disorder) is characterized by persistent fear 
and avoidance of social interactions. We hope that our results will lead to further fertile 
research on such health disorders and the potential role of possible dysfunctions in 
neuroendocrine mechanisms such as the oxytocinergic system. Further progress in this area 
also requires more detailed knowledge about the mechanism of brain penetration of OT 
following different methods of administration and the relationship between plasma and central 
OT, including possible cross-talks of the neuropeptide at other central receptors (Bartz and 
Hollander, 2006; Heinrichs and Domes, 2008).  
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Experimental Procedures 
Subjects 
A total of 49 healthy male students (mean age ± s.d., 21.7 ± 2.5) from different universities in 
Zurich participated in the study. One reason for taking only one sex is that OT may strongly 
vary across male and female subjects, which introduces an additional source of noise. 
Subjects with chronic diseases, mental disorders, medication, or those who smoked or abused 
drugs or alcohol were excluded from the study. Participants abstained from food and drink 
(other than water) for 2 hours before the experiment, and from exercise, caffeine, and alcohol 
during the 24 hours before the session. In addition, we administered the Brief Symptom 
Inventory Scales (BSI), brief psychological self-reports that measure symptoms with several 
scales; none of the subjects was in the clinical range and there were no significant differences 
between the placebo and OT group in either scale (see supplementary Table 4). Participants 
were informed at the time of recruitment that the experiment evaluates the effects of a 
hormone on decision making. The study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki principles and approved by the institutional ethics committee. All subjects gave 
written, informed consent and were informed of their right to discontinue participation at any 
time. 
 
Substance administration  
Subjects were randomly assigned to the OT or placebo group (double-blind, placebo-
controlled study design). Recent research has shown that neuropeptides, such as vasopressin, 
gain access to the human brain after intranasal administration (Born et al., 2002), providing a 
useful method for studying the central nervous system effects of the neuropeptide oxytocin in 
humans (Heinrichs and Gaab, 2007). As oxytocin and vasopressin are closely related 
structurally, differing in only two amino acids, a pharmacokentically similar mechanism 
regarding the pathway to the brain has been assumed for both peptides (Bartz and Hollander, 
2006; Heinrichs and Domes, 2008). Subjects received a single dose of 24 IU OT (Syntocinon-
Spray, Novartis, Basel, Switzerland; 3 puffs per nostril, each with 4 IU OT) intranasally or a 
placebo 50 minutes before the start of the trust and risk experiment. In order to avoid any 
subjective substance effects other than those caused by OT (e.g., olfactory effects), the 
placebo contained all inactive ingredients except for the neuropeptide. Intranasal OT is widely 
prescribed for lactating women and has been used in several experimental studies in humans 
with no adverse side effects being reported (Heinrichs et al., 2003; Heinrichs et al., 2004). 
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Because of potential diurnal variations in endogenous hormone secretion, we restricted the 
time of exogenous OT administration to 2 p.m. to 4 p.m.  
 
Design  
In total, subjects played 12 rounds of a trust game against 12 different and anonymous human 
interaction partners and 12 rounds of a risk game in which a random mechanism determined 
the outcome of the game. The parameters of the experiment were determined with the help of 
behavioral pilot experiments. We wanted to ensure, in particular, that the trustees breach the 
investors’ trust in the trust game in about 50% of the cases, which we did by using the 
trustees’ choices from the pilot experiment as an input (i.e. as responses from the trustees) for 
the scanner experiment. Moreover, the computerized responses to the investment decisions in 
the risk game were drawn from a distribution that perfectly mimics the distribution of the 
trustees’ choices in the pilot experiment. In this way we ensured that the investors in the risk 
and the trust experiment received the same feedback. Trust and risk periods were presented 
counterbalanced and pseudo-randomized. Rudimentary feedback information consisting of a 
reinforcement rate of 50% was revealed to the subjects in the scanner after half of the played 
trust and risk periods. In this feedback, subjects received the following information separately 
for the risk and trust game. First they were informed in how many of 6 risk and 6 trust periods 
they invested money (regardless of the amount). In addition, they were told in how many of 
these periods they received a back transfer. For example, if the investor invested in 4 out of 6 
periods in the trust game, he first was reminded of his transfer behavior and then he received 
the feedback information that a back transfer was executed in 2 out of the 4 periods in which 
he invested. If the investor invested money in an even number of periods, the reinforcement 
rate was exactly 50%. If money was invested in an odd number of periods, for example, in 
only 3 periods of the trust game, a random device determined with 50% probability whether 
trust was repaid in 1 or 2 out of the three trusting cases. This procedure ensures that the 
investor's trust was betrayed in about 50% of the cases (or that the investor's investment 
yielded a return in 50% of the cases in the risk game,). After the feedback had been presented, 
investors played another 6 trust periods against 6 other human partners and 6 risk games 
without getting feedback information. Finally, they received detailed feedback information for 
each of the 12 trust and 12 risk periods at the end of the experiment.  
Prior to scanning, subjects read written instructions describing the sequence of events, 
the payoff rules, details of the risk and the trust game, and were informed that they would 
receive feedback after the first 12 periods of a random sequence of trust and risk games. After 
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the subjects had read the instructions, we checked whether they understood the payoff rules, 
the treatment conditions, and when they would receive feedback information by means of 
several hypothetical questions. All subjects answered the control questions correctly. Thus, all 
subjects knew that the whole experiment would last for 24 periods and that they would 
receive feedback information after 12 periods. Subjects received a lump sum payment of CHF 
80 for participating in the experiment plus the additional money earned during the 24 
risk/trust periods (exchange rate 5 money units = 1.- Swiss Franc, that is about 0.8 $). 
Subjects earned on average about 140.- Swiss Francs in the experiment.  
 
Procedure 
The computer screens that the subjects needed to see during the 24 decision trials were 
presented via a video projector onto a translucent screen that subjects viewed inside the 
scanner via a mirror. At the beginning of each period, the subjects were presented a fixation 
cross in the middle of the screen for 10 to 12 seconds (randomly jittered in the interval 10-
12s). The second screen in a period showed the treatment condition, indicating either the 
beginning of a trust period or a risk period for 4 seconds using a schematic picture of a human 
or computer, respectively (see Figure 2). After 4 seconds, 4 buttons representing the four 
response options were presented on the same screen, indicating that the subjects could now 
implement their decisions, with a time restriction of 8 seconds, by means of a 4-button input 
device. On average, decisions were implemented 5.3 seconds (standard error: 0.103) after the 
treatment condition (either a trust or a risk period) appeared on the screen. After the subjects 
had made their decision, a fixation cross was presented for 4 seconds. After these 4s a forth 
screen indicated a waiting epoch for 8 seconds, during which the subjects in the scanner 
received the information that the trustees are now deciding or that the lotteries are now being 
played. As mentioned above, feedback information was first shown after 6 risk and 6 trust 
periods had been played. After subjects had finished all 12 risk and 12 trust periods they 
received rudimentary feedback information for the post-feedback phase (i.e., for the 6 risk and 
6 trust periods in that phase) and afterwards we gave them detailed feedback information for 
every of the 12 risk and 12 trust periods. The rudimentary feedback info in the middle and at 
the end of the experiment was depicted for 25 seconds each. The software package z-TREE 
(Fischbacher, 2007), a program for conducting behavioral experiments in combination with 
neuroimaging, was used for presenting screens and for collecting behavioral and timing data.  
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Questionnaire measures 
To measure alterations in the psychological state of the subjects throughout the course of the 
experiment, we assessed their mood, calmness, and wakefulness at the beginning of the 
experiment (before substance administration) and after the scanning session, by means of a 
suitable questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997). Roughly two weeks after the experiment took 
place in the scanner, the subjects also completed personality questionnaires that assessed their 
general trust (Siegrist et al., 2005) and sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1996; Zuckerman.M 
and Link, 1968) behavior. The general trust scale is established using a 10 item questionnaire, 
where general trust is defined as the conviction that most people can be trusted most of the 
time. A person with a high level of general trust assumes, in the absence of other information, 
that the other person will be trustworthy. In other words, the general trust scale measures the 
general belief in human benevolence. Strong positive correlation between this general trust 
scale and an investor’s trusting behavior in a one-shot trust game with anonymous partners is 
reported, whereas no such correlations were found in repeated trust games with the same 
partner or in one shot-games when participants received information about their partner’s 
trustworthiness (Siegrist et al., 2006). To measure sensation seeking, we used the SSS-V 
developed by Zuckerman (Zuckerman, 1996; Zuckerman.M and Link, 1968), which has 
proven validity and reliability. The SSS-V consists of 40 questions divided into four subscales 
and one complete scale. The 4 subscales measures subject’s motivation in engaging in sports 
activities involving some physical danger or risk, the desire for uninhibited behavior in social 
situations, the desire to seek new experiences through unconventional friends and travel, and 
the aversion to repetition of any kind. The advantage of this delayed completion of the 
questionnaires is twofold. First, the administered hormone does not influence the completion 
of the questionnaires, and second, subjects were not aware that the completion of these 
questionnaires was associated with the experiment in the scanner and thus, carry-over effects 
between the behavior in the experiment and the questionnaires are highly unlikely.  
 
fMRI acquisition and analysis  
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla Philips Intera whole body MR Scanner (Philips 
Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) equipped with an 8-channel Philips SENSE head 
coil. Structural image acquisition consisted of 180 T_1–weighted transversal images (0.75 
mm slice thickness). For functional imaging, a total of 310 volumes were obtained using a 
SENSitivity Encoded (SENSE; (Pruessmann et al., 1999)) T_2 *-weighted echo-planar 
imaging sequence with an acceleration factor of 2.0. 40 axial slices were acquired covering 
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the whole brain with a slice thickness of 3mm; no inter-slice gap; interleaved acquisition; TR 
= 3000 ms; TE = 35ms; flip angle = 77°, field of view = 220mm; matrix size = 80 × 80. In 
order to optimize functional sensitivity in orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal lobes, we 
used a tilted acquisition in an oblique orientation at 30* to the AC-PC line.  
For the preprocessing and statistical analyses, the statistical parametric mapping 
software package (SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) 
implemented in Matlab (Version 7) were used. For analysis, all images were realigned to the 
first volume, corrected for motion artefacts and time of acquisition within a TR, normalized (3 
× 3 × 3 mm3) into standard stereotaxic space (template provided by the Montreal Neurological 
Institute), and smoothed using an 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. A 
band-pass filter, which was composed of a discrete cosine-basis function with a cut-off period 
of 128 seconds for the high-pass filter was applied. In order to increase signal to noise ratio, 
global intensity changes were minimized by scaling each image to the grand mean.  
We performed random-effects analyses on the functional data for the decision phase. 
For that purpose, we defined a general linear model (GLM) that included 4 regressors of 
interests and 9 other regressors. The 4 regressors of interests were modelled for the decision 
phase consisting of 6 decision periods with onsets at the time of treatment screen appearance 
(6 trust periods pre-feedback, 6 trust periods post-feedback, 6 risk periods pre-feedback and 6 
risk periods post-feedback). Offsets of the decision phases (regressor’s length) were 
individually modelled based on the subjects’ button press. In addition, 4 regressors of non-
interests were modelled for the waiting epoch (duration 8 seconds) and 4 for the fixation time 
between decision and waiting epoch (duration 4 seconds), again broken down for the two 
treatments (trust and risk game) and two phases (pre-feedback and post-feedback). Finally, 
another regressor of non-interests modelled the three feedback periods (rudimentary feedback 
after 12 periods, rudimentary feedback after the second 12 periods, and full feedback after all 
24 periods). All regressors were convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function 
(HRF). The 6 scan-to-scan motion parameters produced during realignment were included as 
additional regressors in the SPM analysis to account for residual effects of scan to scan 
motion. The correction for multiple comparisons in whole-brain analyses was carried out 
using an uncorrected p value of 0.005 combined with a cluster-size threshold of 10 voxels 
(Forman et al., 1995). Furthermore, we focused in our analyses on specific apriori defined 
regions of interests, in particular the amygdala, midbrain regions and the caudate. Other brain 
regions, which are significant at the same threshold, are also reported (see Table 1 and 2). 
However, we are reluctant to make strong interpretations based on these results because no 
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apriori hypotheses have been made. In case of significant unilateral activations in our main 
regions of interests, including amygdala and striatum, we lowered the significance threshold 
to P < 0.01 (uncorrected) with the same voxel extent to verify whether a bilateral activation 
pattern could be found with this threshold.  
Linear contrasts of regression coefficients were computed at the individual subject level 
and then taken to a group level random effects analysis of variance. The following four 
different t contrast images were calculated for the different analyses of the decision phase at 
the individual level using the four regressors of interests: trust periods pre-feedback > risk 
periods pre-feedback, trust periods post-feedback > risk periods post-feedback, risk periods 
pre-feedback > trust periods pre-feedback and risk periods post-feedback > trust periods post-
feedback. For second-level random effects analysis, the single-subject contrasts were entered 
into two two-way ANOVAs with the following factors: “time phase” (pre-feedback, post-
feedback as a within subject factor) and “group” (placebo, oxytocin as a between subject 
factor), and separately for the single subjects contrasts trust > risk (pre-feedback and post-
feedback) and risk > trust (pre-feedback and post-feedback). Based on these ANOVAs, we 
calculated the following 8 serial subtraction contrasts, focusing on the first four contrasts, 
based on our hypothesis of differential brain activation patterns between OT and placebo in 
the Trust and not Risk Game.  
Trust game:  
• OT group (Trust pre-feedback > Risk pre-feedback) > Placebo group (Trust pre-
feedback > Risk pre-feedback) 
• OT group (Trust post-feedback > Risk post-feedback) > Placebo group (Trust post-
feedback > Risk post-feedback) 
• Placebo group (Trust pre-feedback > Risk pre-feedback) > OT group (Trust pre-
feedback > Risk pre-feedback) 
• Placebo group (Trust post-feedback > Risk post-feedback) > OT group (Trust post-
feedback > Risk post-feedback) 
Risk game: 
• OT group (Risk pre-feedback > Trust pre-feedback) > Placebo group (Risk pre-
feedback > Trust pre-feedback) 
• OT group (Risk post-feedback > Trust post-feedback) > Placebo group (Risk post-
feedback > Trust post-feedback) 
• Placebo group (Risk pre-feedback > Trust pre-feedback) > OT group (Risk pre-
feedback > Trust pre-feedback) 
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• Placebo group (Risk post-feedback > Trust post-feedback) > OT group (Risk post-
feedback > Trust post-feedback) 
All described serial subtraction terms were exclusively masked at p < 0.05 with the reversed 
second contrast of the serial subtraction term in order to make sure that the observed 
differences between the two groups are not due to differences in the reversed second contrast 
(Bermpohl et al., 2006).  
We created ROIs using the MarsBaR software for all regions showing significant activations 
based on the described serial subtraction terms (depicted in Table 1 and 2), including our 
main regions of interests (Amygdala, Striatum, Midbrain regions and anterior cingulate 
cortex). ROIs for amygdala and striatum were defined by a combined functional and 
anatomical criterion by selecting all voxels in the anatomical brain regions (according to the 
anatomical atlas of Tzourio-Mazoyer (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002)) that were significantly 
(p< 0.01) activated in the corresponding serial subtraction term (please see Table 2). In 
addition, we created functional ROIs for all other brain regions by selecting all voxels that 
were significantly activated at p<0.005 in the corresponding serial subtraction terms (please 
see Table 1 and 2). Using these ROIs and the software package SPSS (version 13), we 
conducted repeated-measures ANOVAs using participants’ mean beta weights to further 
investigate lateralization patterns and time effects. In addition, we calculated repeated-
measures and univariate ANOVAs to control for potentially confounding variables that we 
used in the analysis of investors’ choices and response times.  
 
Behavioral and psychometrical analysis  
For the behavioral data of the risk and trust game (transfer decisions), we first created two 
trust and two risk indexes, consisting of the average transfer during 6 trust or risk periods 
either played in the pre-feedback or the post-feedback phase. Using these 4 behavioral 
indexes, 2 two-way repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed (separately for the trust and 
risk indexes) with the following factors: “time phase” (pre-feedback, post-feedback as a 
within subject factor) and “group” (placebo, OT as a between subject factor). We controlled 
for general trust (Siegrist et al., 2006) and sensation seeking (Zuckerman.M and Link, 1968) 
scores (using questionnaire measures described above) in these ANOVAs and for the 
feedback information after the first 6 trust and 6 risk periods. We controlled for these 
variables due to the following reasons. First, general trust and sensation seeking have been 
shown to correlate positively with the trusting behavior in trust games (Schechter, 2006; 
Siegrist et al., 2006). Second, because of an integer problem, the reinforcement rate of 50% 
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could imply slightly different feedback information if the number of positive investment 
decisions (i.e., investments greater than 0) were odd. In these cases, a random mechanism 
determined whether to reinforce more or less than 50%. For example, if a subject invested 3 
times in the first 6 periods of the trust game, the subject received information that the trustees 
repaid either in 1 of the three cases or in 2 of the three trusting cases. On average, these 
differences in feedback information cancel out (i.e., all treatments are affected in the same 
way) but we nevertheless control for these differences in our ANOVA’s to rule out any 
influence of this feature of our experiments on our results.  
For the psychometrical mood questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997), a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed with the following factors: “time” (Pre-Scan: before 
substance administration, Post-Scan: 10 Minutes after the end of the experiment; as a within 
subject factor) and “group” (placebo, OT, as a between subject factor). Finally, responses time 
differences (pre-feedback and post-feedback for the risk and trust game) as well as subjective 
rating scales of the BIS were analysed using independent t-Tests with group (OT, placebo) as 
a between subject factor. Results were considered significant at the level of p < 0.05 (two-
tailed). In case of a significant multivariate effect, post hoc paired t-tests were computed using 
the Bonferroni correction according to Holm (Holm, 1979). As effect size measure ETA2 is 
reported. Psychometrical and behavioral analyses were performed using the statistical 
software package SPSS 13 for PC (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). 
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Figure 1: The trust game.  
 
 
At the beginning of each new trust period, investor and trustee receive an initial endowment 
of 12 money units (MUs). The investor then can decide to keep all MUs or to send 4, 8 or 12 
MU to the trustee. The experimenter triples the transferred money. The trustee then has the 
option of keeping the whole amount he received or sending back a payoff equalizing amount 
of money. For example, if the investor sends 8 MU units, the trustee receives 24 MU, giving 
him in total 36 MU (12 MU own endowment + 24 MU tripled transfer) while the investor has 
only 4 MU at this stage of the game. Then the investor can chose a back transfer of zero or a 
back transfer of 16 MU units. The experimenter does not triple the back transfer. Thus, if the 
trustee chooses a back transfer of zero MUs, he earns 36 MU units in the current period, while 
the investor only earns 4 MU. If the trustee, however, chooses a back transfer of 16 MU, both 
players end up with the same total amount of 20 MU. In the risk game the investor faced the 
same investment opportunities as in the trust game, i.e., he could invest 0, 4, 8 or 12 MU, and 
for every positive investment the computer chooses a zero investment return or a return equal 
to that which could be achieved in the trust game. The investment returns were drawn 
randomly from the probability distribution generated by the trustees’ behavior in the trust 
game. Thus, investors in the trust and the risk game faced the same objective risk, but no 
social betrayal could occur in the risk game because no trustees were involved in the back 
transfers.  
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Figure 2: Timeline for trust and lottery periods.  
 
Timeline for one period of the trust (top) and lottery game (bottom) for the investor (Player 
A) whose brain was observed in the scanner. A total of 12 trust and 12 lottery periods were 
played. At the beginning of each new period, a decision screen indicated whether a trust or 
lottery period will be played. The “trust screen” depicted a schematic picture of a human 
being while the “lottery screen” depicted a schematic picture of a computer. After 4 seconds, 
4 buttons representing the 4 response options appeared on the screen, indicating that the 
subject now had 8 seconds to implement a decision. After the subjects made their choice, a 
fixation cross appeared for 4 seconds, after which a screen indicated a waiting epoch of 8 
seconds. During that time, the subjects in the scanner were informed that the trustees (Player 
B) are now deciding or that the random mechanism determines the returns from the lottery. 
Finally, periods were separated by a screen depicting a fixation cross with a variable duration 
of 10-12 seconds. Importantly, after half of the played trust and lottery periods, a feedback 
screen appeared for 25 seconds, consisting of meager feedback indicating that only in about 
50% of the cases the trustees shared the money or the lottery did yield a return, respectively.  
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Figure 3: Investors’ average transfer in the risk and trust game across the pre-feedback 
and the post-feedback phases.  
 
 
Each data point represents the average over 6 decision periods (please see supplementary 
Table 1 and supplementary Figure 1 for S.E.M.). The Figure shows the interaction effect in 
the trust game (group×phase: F(1,40) = 4.06, p = 0.05, ETA2 = 0.11), indicating a differential 
adaptation in trusting behavior after the meager feedback in the OT (red colour) compared to 
the placebo group (green colour). While subjects receiving OT demonstrate no significant 
change in their trusting behavior, subjects receiving the placebo decrease theirs. In contrast, 
subjects receiving OT and the placebo respond in the same way to the feedback in the risk 
game by keeping their investments almost constant.  
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Figure 4: Brain regions showing stronger activation in the placebo compared to the 
oxytocin group.  
 
Depicted on sagittal or coronal slices is the increased activation in the placebo compared to 
the oxytocin group in trust periods played (A) pre-feedback (including ACC) and (B) post-
feedback (including bilateral amygdala, bilateral caudate nucleus and midbrain brain regions). 
All regions are significant at p < 0.005 with a cluster extent of 10 voxels. However, for 
display purposes all regions are depicted at p < 0.01. Bar plots represent differences in 
contrast estimates (trust > risk) of functional ROI’s (see method section for details) for 
bilateral amygdala, right caudatus,  midbrain regions and ACC, broken down for the oxytocin 
(in red colour) and placebo group (in green colour) as well as time phase (pre-feedback/post-
feedback). Univariate and repeated measures ANOVAs calculated with and without control 
for potentially confounding variables (including general trust, sensation seeking, first 
feedback) confirmed for each depicted brain regions the interaction effect of group × phase, 
qualified by stronger activation in these brain regions in the placebo compared to the oxytocin 
group either only in pre-feedback or only in post-feedback periods.   
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Table 1: Brain activation differences between oxytocin and placebo in pre-
feedback game periods 
 
Condition Contrasts Brain regions BA Side x y z Max t Score Voxels 
Temporal Lobe Oxytocin > 
Placebo  
(R-T)OT–(R-T)P
Inferior Temporal Gyrus 37 R 39 -54 -15 3.16 * 14 
Parietal Lobe 
Precuneus/ Posterior 
cingulum 
31 L -15 -60 21 3.09 * 11 
Risk 
Game 
Placebo > 
Oxytocin  
(R-T)P–(R-T)OT
Superior Parietal Gyrus 7 R 30 -60 48 3.08 * 21 
Subcortical structures Oxytocin > 
Placebo 
(T-R)OT–(T-R)P Thalamus, Pulvinar  R 15 -27 6 3.53 *** 13 
Frontal Lobe 
ACC 24 R 6 24 12 3.18 ** 20 
Trust 
Game 
Placebo > 
Oxytocin 
(T-R)P–(T-R)OT
° ACC 24 R 15 33 9 2.83 *  
 
The coordinates of activated brain regions are given according to the MNI space together with the t-scores and 
significance thresholds (*P < 0.005, ** P < 0.001, ***P < 0.0005, uncorrected for multiple comparisons). R 
denotes risk game, T denotes trust game, OT denotes oxytocin and P denotes placebo. Minimum cluster size 10 
voxels. All observed maxima are reported. ° indicates a sub peak in the same cluster of voxels. All serial 
contrasts are masked exclusively at p < 0.05 using the reversed second contrast of the serial subtraction term. 
Regions of interests discussed in the paper are cursive.   
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Table 2: Brain activation differences between Oxytocin and Placebo in post-
feedback game periods 
 
Condition  Contrast Brain regions BA Side x y z Max t Score Voxels 
Oxytocin > 
Placebo 
(R-T)OT–(R-T)P
No suprathreshold clusters 
Risk 
game 
Placebo > 
Oxytocin 
(R-T)P–(R-T)OT
No suprathreshold clusters 
Oxytocin > 
Placebo  
(T-R)OT–(T-R)P
No suprathreshold clusters 
Temporal Lobe 
Amygdala  R 30 3 -18 3.06 * 12 
Amygdala  L -24 0 -21 3.12 * 
° Amygdala  L -27 0 -12 2.48 °° 
14 
Parietal Lobe 
Postcentral Gyrus 5 L -27 -54 69 2.96 * 10 
Subcortical structures 
Putamen/ Insula  L -33 -21 0 3.15 * 11 
Caudate Body  R 12 6 9 3.08 * 
° Caudate Body  R 12 3 18 2.88 * 
° Caudate Head  R 9 9 0 2.87 * 
16 
Caudate Body  L -9 0 12 2.76 °° 10 
Trust 
game 
Placebo > 
Oxytocin 
(T-R)P–(T-R)OT
 
Brainstem, Midbrain, 
Red Nucleus 
 L -3 -24 -3 3.03 * 11 
 
The coordinates are given according to the MNI space together with its T-scores and significant thresholds (°° 
P< 0.01, *P < 0.005, ** P < 0.001, ***P < 0.0005 (all uncorrected for multiple comparisons). R denotes risk 
game, T denotes trust game, OT denotes oxytocin and P denotes placebo. Minimum cluster size 10 voxels. ° 
indicates a sub peak in the same cluster of voxels. All observed maxima are reported. All serial contrasts are 
masked exclusively at p < 0.05 using the reversed second contrast of the serial subtraction term. Regions of 
interests discussed in the paper are cursive.   
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